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ABSTRACT
Current schemes to detect cheating in online games often build
on the assumption that the applied cheat takes actions that are
drastically different from normal behavior. For instance, an Aimbot
for a first-person shooter is used by an amateur player to increase
his/her capabilities many times over. Attempts to evade detection
would require to reduce the intended effect such that the advantage
is presumably lowered into insignificance. We argue that this is not
necessarily the case and demonstrate how a professional player is
able tomake use of an adaptive Aimbot that mimics user behavior to
gradually increase performance and thus evades state-of-the-art de-
tection mechanisms. We show this in a quantitative and qualitative
evaluationwith two professional “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive”
players, two open-source Anti-Cheat systems, and the commercially
established combination of VAC, VACnet, and Overwatch.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the online gaming industry vendors and operators have a natural
interesting in preventing cheating. On the one hand, honest players
lose interest in the game if the game objective is undermined to an
extent that leaves the impression behind that there is no point in
even playing. On the other hand, cheats might be used to gather in-
game assets in order to, for instance, sell them in the real world [19].
Both directly affect the monetization opportunities of the game:
Paying customers (the players) might leave the platform, and al-
ternative markets that sell virtual goods are in direct competition
with the vendor’s in-app purchases. Moreover, e-sport tournaments
have evolved to huge events that conclude sponsorship contracts,
sell broadcasting rights, and distribute trophy money of millions of
US Dollars [3].
Popular genres, for instance, are battle arena games such as
“Dota 2” and first-person shooters like “Counter-Strike: Global Of-
fensive” (CS:GO). According to Steam statistics, in 2019 these games
had 745 k and 600 k users per day on average [2]. By these numbers,
one can easily grasp the influence and market value of such games.
The type of cheat, of course, very much depends on the type
of game. In first-person shooters, for instance, tools that assist
in aiming and shooting at an opponent are particularly popular
to enhance a player’s capabilities. This includes different forms
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and manifestations, such as aim-locking, aim and trigger bots, and
recoil reduction, which are collectively termed as “Aimbots” in
common usage [12].
In the past a number of different approaches have been con-
sidered to detect cheating entities in games [e.g., 1, 6, 10, 13] and
Aimbots in particular [11, 20], many of which use data mining or
machine learning tools. Also Valve, the developer of the aforemen-
tioned games, has recently started to use deep learning to detect
cheating users in “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive” [12]. These
systems rely on detecting the difference between normal user char-
acteristics and observed behavior. If these diverge too strongly, a
cheat is detected. This is particularly striking for inexperienced
players that suddenly become extraordinary effective or bots that
perform actions in a flash. Current detectors thus focus on these sit-
uations and brush off more subtle scenarios where improvement is
less striking. Liu et al. [11], for instance, state that Aimbots would
only be able to evade detection if they “degrade their performance
significantly and play like average players”. We however believe that
this is not true and argue that adaptive Aimbots, that gradually im-
prove aiming and shooting performance, are particularly effective
for skillful players, that already perform well but use assistance to
proceed to the next level. The average number of matches won in
the two highest CS:GO ranks are only 5 % apart [5, 17]. Dishonest
professional players are more likely to cause financial damage in a
tournament setting, while amateurs using Aimbots might spoil the
game for other users on a wider basis, such that both need to be
equally countered.
To motivate future research on detecting Aimbots, that are used
by amateurs and in particular by professional players, in this paper,
we explore the feasibility of adaptive Aimbots that mimic user im-
provement to evade state-of-the-art detection mechanisms. To this
end, we look upon first-person shooter games and define player
profiles using properties that capture user behavior with respect
to aiming as well as shooting capabilities. Based on these, we then
define gradual improvement of the individual features with the
objective of increasing the hit count. In an evaluation on a pri-
vate “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive” server, we demonstrate the
evasion of two open-source systems, “COW Anti-Cheat” [4] and
“Sourcemod Anti-Cheat” [14], before we proceed to play on an offi-
cial server secured by VAC [18], VACnet [12], and Overwatch [16].
To simulate a gain in ranks, we operate on a hit-count improve-
ment of 5 % and show that also in the second experiment, in a total
of 60 matches (about 45–60minutes each) with two experienced
players in separate teams of five, our Aimbot went unnoticed and
the associated accounts remained active up until today.
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Finally, we have conducted a quantitative and qualitative evalu-
ation of the influence of the automatic adaptations on professional
gameplay, showing that although the overall hit count could be im-
proved, interventions may distract and even disrupt the flow of play.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Aimbots for professional players.We are the first to ad-
dress the scenario of Aimbots used by skillful players to
incrementally improve performance in a stealthy way.
• Evasion of state-of-the-art detection. We demonstrate
the successful evasion of commercial Anti-Cheat mecha-
nisms that are currently deployed on official game servers
by mimicking gradual user improvement.
• Open-source tools. To foster future research and improve
existing Aimbot detectors, we make all our implementations
for recording player profiles and mimicking user behavior
publicly available at:
https://intellisec.org/research/aimbots
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2,
we first describe different properties for generating user profiles and
we present ways to mimic these to subvert detection in Section 3.
The evaluation of the employed mechanism is presented in Sec-
tion 4, demonstrating our Aimbots stealthiness in practice, before
we discuss related work in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 PLAYER PROFILES
To characterize a player, we use a comprehensive set of properties
describing different aspects of first-person shooter gameplay. These
properties are associated with either aiming or actual shots fired,
and are summarized in Table 1.
Properties 𝑝𝑎1 & 𝑝𝑎2 and 𝑝𝑠1 & 𝑝𝑠2 describe features that, ac-
cording to Liu et al. [11], are particularly discriminating for human
players, such as the position of player and target (𝑝𝑎1), body loca-
tion of the first hit (𝑝𝑠1), the time to hit (𝑝𝑎2), and the hit ratio (𝑝𝑠2).
Popular anti-cheat systems, such as “COW Anti-Cheat” [4] for in-
stance, moreover use the initially targeted body location (𝑝𝑠3) and
the overall hit ratio (𝑝𝑠4) as features. We extend the latter to capture
the hit ratio on first attempt (𝑝𝑠5) and also record the time needed
for aiming at an opponent (𝑝𝑎3), which in turn is closely related to
property 𝑝𝑎2 mentioned earlier. Both are combined in property 𝑝𝑎4
that captures the time between defeating one and aiming at another
opponent, which is a crucial skill for a professional player and is
easily automated using Aimbots. To further refine these, we addi-
tionally propose properties 𝑝𝑎5 to 𝑝𝑎7 to also account for typical
behavior in handling weapons when aiming.
By describing the recoil pattern Khalifa [8] has proposed a rarely
considered trajectory-based feature, that however enables to very
well draw conclusions about the shooter. We incorporate this as
property 𝑝𝑠6 and also use similar trajectories during aiming (𝑝𝑎8).
In direct consequence, we consider the first shot fired on such a
trajectory for property 𝑝𝑠7.
Subsequently, we define these properties in detail and describe
how to record them. Section 2.1 focuses on those that concern the
player’s process of aiming and Section 2.2 involves those that relate
to the shots actually fired.
2.1 Aiming
In this section, we focus on the primary task of an Aimbot: the aim-
ing. Next to two properties from related work [11], 𝑝𝑎1 and 𝑝𝑎2,
we introduce six more characteristics, 𝑝𝑎3 to 𝑝𝑎8, that are crucial
elements of first-person shooter gameplay.
2.1.1 Divergence of aiming upon coming into conflict. A skillful
player anticipates the movement of opponents and thus is able
to react faster. Liu et al. [11] use this feature to identify amateurs.
Together with observations of efficient eliminations, this may be an
indicator of an Aimbot. Property 𝑝𝑎1 measures the deviation of the
character’s line of gaze, a ∈ R3, to the viewing direction, b ∈ R3,
that is necessary to see the closest body part of his/her opponent,
𝛿 = arccos
(
a · b
|a| |b|
)
,
and we compute the average over 𝑛 events.
2.1.2 Time to kill. A rather straight-forward metric is the “effec-
tivity of a player” in terms of defeating his/her opponent. For their
detector, Liu et al. [11] measure the time between the first sighting
of an opponent in the current scene, 𝑡1, to a lethal shot, 𝑡2. The
average across 𝑛 events 1𝑛
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 (𝑡2 − 𝑡1) denotes 𝑝𝑎2.
2.1.3 Aiming duration. For property 𝑝𝑎3, we break down the “time
to kill” to the time actually taken for aiming at an opponent. The
measurement’s starting point in time, 𝑡 ′1, is defined by the oppo-
nent entering a rather narrow field of vision, simulating the “lock
region” of an Aimbot before it aims at the opponent and fires a
shot. Consequently, the measurement is stopped when the player
directly aims at the opponent, 𝑡 ′2, such that 𝑡1 < 𝑡
′
1 < 𝑡
′
2 < 𝑡2 holds
true. Again, the measurements are averaged over 𝑛 events.
2.1.4 Duration between a kill and aiming at another opponent. In
case a scene shows multiple opponents the time between elimi-
nating one opponent, 𝑡2, and aiming at the next one, 𝑡 ′3, can be a
revealing feature of an Aimbot. An human player is not able to
immediately jump between opposing viewing angles of multiple
battles in short time. A stealthy Aimbot hence needs to delay oper-
ation, meaning, handing over control to the player before assisting
in the next battle or attempt.
2.1.5 Aiming with unloaded weapon. Often the point in time the
player stops pressing the fire button and stopping to aim are differ-
ent. For instance, in the heat of the moment, human players might
keep aiming at an opponent and attempting to shoot although
there is no more ammunition left in the magazine. Many Aimbots,
in turn, immediately stop tracking the target once the player ran
out of bullets. To account for this, property 𝑝𝑎5 measures the time
between the magazine becoming empty, 𝑡empty, and the point in
time the player stops aiming at an opponent, 𝑡4. As for the previous
measures the time duration is averaged over 𝑛 events of that kind.
2.1.6 Switching between primary and secondary weapon. Depend-
ing on the particular situation a professional player chooses be-
tween either reloading the primary weapon or switching over to
another one if the magazine is empty. The latter generally is much
faster and thus is chosen in case the character is not able to cover
or the opponent would start firing back and causing damage. Prop-
erty 𝑝𝑎6 defines the probability of sticking to the primary weapon
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Table 1: Overview of the player profile’s set of properties.
Id Description Time Spacial Frequency New
A
im
in
g
a1 Divergence of aiming upon coming into conflict [11] – ✗ – –
a2 Time to kill [11] ✗ – – –
a3 Aiming duration ✗ – – ✓
a4 Duration between a kill and aiming at another opponent ✗ – – ✓
a5 Aiming with unloaded weapon ✗ – – ✓
a6 Switching between primary and secondary weapon – – ✗ ✓
a7 Time to switch to secondary weapon ✗ – – ✓
a8 Aiming trajectory/ pattern – ✗ – ✓
Sh
ot
sfi
re
d
s1 Suspiciousness of hits [11] – ✗ – –
s2 Ratio of hits when moving [11] – – ✗ –
s3 Primary body part shot at [4] – ✗ – –
s4 Hit precision [4] – – ✗ –
s5 Hit precision at first shot – – ✗ ✓
s6 Recoil compensation [8] – ✗ – –
s7 First shot during movement – ✗ – ✓
and reload, rather than a fast switch to the secondary weapon,
𝑃 (𝑋 = reload). The exact value is highly dependent on the player
such that a sudden change in behavior can be revealing.
2.1.7 Time to switch to secondary weapon. In line with the previ-
ous definition and closely related to property 𝑝𝑎5 (“Aiming with
unloaded weapon”) for 𝑝𝑎7 we measure the time between the mag-
azine becoming empty, 𝑡empty, and the switch to the secondary
weapon, 𝑡s, across 𝑛 events. In practice, this is measured simultane-
ously with the previous criterion. To increase the caused damage,
Aimbots frequently automated the exchange of weapons such that
the player can focus on the overall gameplay. A particular short
time frame between emptying a magazine and switching to the
secondary weapon can thus be a good indicator for Aimbots.
2.1.8 Aiming trajectory/ pattern. The fastest route to correct the
position a player is aiming at is a direct line to the body part to hit.
Many Aimbots choose exactly this naive option, which however is
very different from the movement patterns seen with human play-
ers that often conduct a non-optimal path towards the opponent.
Consequently, Aimbot developers have started to implement so-
called spiral aim patterns to circumvent detection. Figure 1 shows
both types of aiming trajectories.
(a) Spiral aim (b) Linear aim
Figure 1: Two different types of aiming trajectories.
For property 𝑝𝑎8, we thus define two measures to describe such
movements. First, we capture the probability of whether the tra-
jectory takes place above a linear movement, 𝑃 (𝑌 = above), and
second, the height of the arch of a spiral aim as the average vertical
offset during a lateral movement.
2.2 Shots Fired
Interestingly, the majority of related work seems to focus on prop-
erties that describe the actual shots fired during a battle rather than
aiming itself: For instance, properties 𝑝𝑠1–𝑝𝑠4 [4, 11] and 𝑝𝑠6 [8].
These as well as two additional properties are defined subsequently.
2.2.1 Suspiciousness of hits. The more critical hits succeed, the
faster an opponent can be defeated. Landing such hits naturally is
more difficult than hits that cause less damage. Liu et al. [11] thus
model the “suspiciousness” of a critical hit as the relative position 𝑖𝑐
within a sequence of hits 𝑠 that led to defeating the opponent:
𝑣 =
{
1
𝑖𝑐
critical hit in 𝑠
0 otherwise .
For property 𝑝𝑠1 the value 𝑣 is averaged over 𝑛 events/sequences.
2.2.2 Ratio of hits when moving. Property 𝑝𝑠2, that has also been
proposed by Liu et al. [11], measures the probability of hitting the
target when the character is moving. Many first-person shooters are
designed such that aiming is easier when the character stands still
or even kneels down, such that professional players do exactly this,
while amateurs do not. If a player is able to hit the target reliably
although he/she is moving, this usually is out of the ordinary.
2.2.3 Primary body part shot at. To determine the variance of the
shots fired, “COW Anti-Cheat” [4] records the number of hits on
individual body parts. Additionally, over 𝑛 events we record the
probability of whether the shooter hits the body part that is closest
to the initial position of the hairline cross as property 𝑝𝑠3. Having
multiple hits on the nearest body part is extremely effective, which
however is usually only achieved by an Aimbot.
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2.2.4 Hit precision. The probably most straight-forward measure,
next to property 𝑝𝑎2 (“Time to kill”), is the precision of the shots
fired at an opponent [4]. Similarly to the previous definition, for
property 𝑝𝑠4 we determine the number of shots on the target, but
only consider the ratio of shots that hit any body part rather than
missing the opponent at all to the total number of shots fired.
2.2.5 Hit precision at first shot. In addition to the overall hit pre-
cision, for property 𝑝𝑠5 we only consider the first shot in order
to capture the probability of successfully hitting the opponent at
the first attempt. A large value indicates a more effective shooter.
However, extraordinarily high values usually are only achieved
with assistance.
2.2.6 Recoil compensation. When firing an arm in a first-person
shooter game, each weapon has a specific recoil pattern with in-
dividual characteristics, which influences the ability to aim. The
longer one is firing, the larger is the recoil. Figure 2(a) shows these
characteristics on a two-dimensional map for two different weapons
in “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive”. The first shot is marked by
the hairline cross and the color gradient (orange to red) indicates
the sequence of shots fired.
(a) Recoil pattern (b) Recoil compensation
Figure 2: Recoil patterns and compensation [8].
To compensate for recoil patterns and offer a “steady hand”,
Aimbots automatically counteract these characteristic movements
by implementing fixed compensation curves, such as shown in
Figure 2(b). For property 𝑝𝑠6, we thus calculate the average com-
pensation of 𝑘 shots fired per 𝑛 events as the ratio of the difference
of the initial line of gaze, a ∈ R3 (cf. Section 2.1.1), and the viewing
angle for each shot fired, aj ∈ R3, to the location of the hit, cj ∈ R3:
comp =
𝑘∑
𝑗=1
|a − aj |
cj
2.2.7 First shot during movement. Finally, we come back to aiming
movements and consider the point in time an Aimbot starts firing
on the trajectory towards an opponent. Usually, assistance of an
Aimbot is started by pressing the fire button, such that the character
would immediately start shooting. However, only average players
start shooting right away, while skillful players wait till the body
part to hit is lined upwith his/her sights. Property 𝑝𝑠7 thusmeasures
the average divergence of the character’s line of gaze, a ∈ R3, and
the location of the first shot, c1 ∈ R3, as the angle between these
vectors, 1𝑛
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 ∠(a, c1) .
3 MIMICKING USER IMPROVEMENT
Improving the performance of an online gamer can be achieved in
various ways and all to often rather naivemechanisms are employed
that are easily detected. For evading automatic detection, we thus
propose to mimic genuine user improvement. To this end, our
Aimbot first records game statistics according to the previously
defined properties (Section 3.1), based on which the Aimbot then
provides assistance within the capabilities of the player (Section 3.2).
Subsequently, we describe these steps in more detail.
3.1 Recording
In a bootstrapping phase the Aimbot records data from genuine
gameplay to construct a user-specific profile that is then used as
basis for (gradual) improvement. In order to build a model that
is as expressive as possible, the following three criteria need to
be fulfilled:
C1. Game duration. The player is asked to carry out 12 hours
of battles in a competitive setting, which correspond to about
16 matches on average. Additionally, at least this average num-
ber of games needs to be played to prevent recording data from a
few, exceptionally long matches.
C2. Number of games won. At least 10 of these games need to
be won by the player in question such that the profile is not built
from bad performances. This is the same number of matches Valve
asks for, before automatically assigning a skill group or rank [17].
C3. Number of samples. Each of the individual properties defined
in Section 2 requires a minimal number of data points to reliably
model the associated behavior it has been designed for. The specific
values, in turn, have been determined experimentally.
Only the combination of all the above criteria ensures reliable
recordings. Especially the third one has been shown to be crucial in
practice: Occasionally, even during a rather long game there might
not be much contact with an opponent, which renders acquiring the
necessary data impossible. Similarly, if no critical hit is landed (𝑝𝑠1)
and no or not enough switches between primary and secondary
weapon are performed (𝑝𝑎6 & 𝑝𝑎7) these characteristics can not be
sufficiently modelled.
3.2 Imitation
Automated user improvement needs to be executed in a way that
prevents static rules or even a statistical classifier from grasping a
conclusive difference to genuine gameplay. We achieve this through
randomized changes to the properties of the player’s profile with
respect to the data recorded earlier, that however increases perfor-
mance in the long run. For instance, in the case of property 𝑝𝑠3
(“Primary body part shot at”) the Aimbot randomly chooses the
body part to target such that the overall distribution of the property
does not change. However, a player that constantly improves in
each and every property might still draw attention to detection
mechanisms. To circumvent this, we additionally randomize the
growth of each characteristic: In 60 % of the cases the property is
improved to ensure an overall positive progression. In 30 % of time,
though, the value degrades and in 10 % there is no change at all.
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Figure 3: Improvement during adaptive adjustment of properties 𝒑𝒔1, 𝒑𝒔2, 𝒑𝒔4, 𝒑𝒔5, and 𝒑𝒂2.
This methodology works well for most of the described proper-
ties. Yet, for some measures interdependencies to other properties
need to be considered. For instance, when adjusting the aiming
trajectory to strike a balance between linear and spiral aim (𝑝𝑎8)
the bot additionally smoothens the motion according to the time
usually spent for the overall aiming procedure (𝑝𝑎3). Moreover,
there exist situations where the Aimbot must not take action at
all. For instance, “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive” allows to blind
opponents with flash grenades. If the active player is blinded, of
course, it would be easily detectable by humans as well as auto-
mated systems, if a player would still be able to aim or shoot at an
opponent with precision.
4 EVALUATION
We have implemented the previously described strategy of adap-
tively improving a player’s performances based on an existing game
bot for “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive”, called Katebot [9]. The
effectiveness of our approach in practice and its evasion capabilities
are evaluated by conducting the following two experiments: First,
we set up a game server as it is typically used in private domains,
LAN parties, or tournaments, and additionally install publicly avail-
able Anti-Cheat tools (Section 4.1). Second, we proceed to play on
official servers provided by Valve that are protected against cheating
using a combination of VAC, VACnet, and Overwatch (Section 4.2).
4.1 Private Game Server
For our first experiment, we operate a dedicated “Counter-Strike:
Global Offensive” server according to specifications provided by
the vendor [15]. This environment is identically to official game
servers, but is entirely isolated from the outside and does not come
with anti-cheat protection initially. Hence, we additionally install
“COW Anti-Cheat” [4] as well as “Sourcemod Anti-Cheat” [14],
two open-source systems for detecting cheats such as Aimbots.
Unfortunately, the detector by Liu et al. [11], AimDetect, has not
been made available to us for examination and thus could not be
included in this experiment.
Evasion. The number of match wins of the two highest CS:GO
ranks are about 5 % apart [5]. As an initial test of our Aimbot’s
stealthiness, we thus play with a fixed improvement objective of 5 %.
Both open-source detectors implement rule-based detection and
thus are designed to report any abuses immediately. Consequently,
playing a few games is enough to verify that our Aimbot is not
detected. Unsurprisingly, as we have actively included some of
the measures also used by these detectors (e.g., 𝑝𝑠3 and 𝑝𝑠4), our
Aimbot has indeed remained unnoticed.
CPU/Memory Consumption. Additionally, we have run prelimi-
nary test on the consumption of resources to ensure that the overall
gaming experience is not negatively influenced due to the super-
vision implemented by our Aimbot. Short-time freezes or lags are
particularly critical for first-person shooters. Our implementation
merely uses 1–2 % of additionally CPU and only 170MiB on average,
such that no perceivable influence is imposed on the players.
4.2 Public Game Server
As final and most crucial experiment, we now deploy our Aimbot
on official “Counter-Strike: Global Offensive” game servers run by
the game vendor. In contrast to private servers, these additionally
employ a combination of VAC, VACnet, and Overwatch.
VAC [18] is a client-side detector that is built upon signature-
based detection, checking for memory modifications, and the anal-
ysis of DNS caches to detect requests to servers associated with
cheat software. VACnet [12], in turn, is a rather new server-side
mechanism that analyzes behavioral patterns and learns them us-
ing methods from deep learning based on very similar features
as described in Section 2. According to McDonald [12], it verifi-
ably detects 80–95 % of the cheats. The verification is provided by
Overwatch [16], a community-driven regulative system, where ex-
perienced players act as reviewers for incidents reported by other
users as well as automatic detection.
To limit the ethical implications of our experiment, all games
have been performed during practice sessions, such that none of
the contestants suffer a loss in CS:GO ranks or even financial loss.
Quantitative results. For this experiment, two players conduct a
total of 60matches of about 45–60minutes each. Each contestant
plays 15 gameswith and 15 gameswithout Aimbot in a team of five
players (team members are randomly assigned by the game server).
Similarly to the previous experiment a fixed improvement objective
of 5 % above the user’s profile is set. While the overall improvement
was clearly noticeable in the time needed to defeat an opponent,
not all properties have had equally positive response.
Figure 3 and Table 2 break down the results for five of the pro-
file’s properties in detail. Property 𝑝𝑠1 measures how early one
achieves a critical hit during a battle, which Liu et al. [11] argue to
be indicative for how suspicious hits are. Our experiments shown
that it is not as simple as that and adjusting the hit rate may even
influence a player negatively. The performance of Player B, for
instance, decays by 19.6 % in comparison to playing genuinely. For
the ratio of successful hits when moving [11], in turn, Player A
seems to struggle with the automatic interventions of the Aimbot,
such that precision is 19.2 % worse than before. For Player A no
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Table 2: Improvement per player.
Id Description Player A Player B
s1 Suspiciousness of hits [11] +0.2 % −19.6 %
s2 Ratio of hits when moving [11] −19.2 % −0.7 %
s4 Hit precision [4] +5.7 % +8.2 %
s5 Hit precision at first shot +8.1 % +16.9 %
a2 Time to kill [11] −4.7 % −4.3 %
significant change could be observed. The overall hit precision and
the precision at the first shot have been successfully improved for
both players by 5 % up to even 16 %, though.
Bottom line, the Aimbot was able to decrease the time to defeat
an opponent as intended by roughly 5 %. Especially for interven-
tions in highly dynamic actions, however, skillful players seem to
struggle with external influence to different extent and dependent
on their specific customs. A thorough evaluation of these influences,
however, is left to future work.
Qualitative results. After each match the (active) players have
been asked to report on their experience with the Aimbot. The
overall quality of gameplay has been perceived as broadly satisfac-
tory and the Aimbot has supported actions well. A few things did
stand out, though. Skillful players, for instance, frequently conduct
so-called “one-taps”, single shots fired off by briefly touching the
fire button to limit recoil. In its current implementation the Aimbot
adjusts the proposed measures for every single shot, such that care-
fully placed one-taps are often rendered ineffective. We suspect
this to be a one of the major reasons for the negative influence on
properties 𝑝𝑠1 and s2.
While the following is entirely anecdotally, both players have
reported that they have been complimented by other players for
their good performance during matches supported by the Aimbot.
Evasion. There exist two aspects to cheat detection on official
game servers: Either an opposing player reports one as fraud or
automatic detection kicks in. In both cases, the Overwatch jury
manually examines video recordings of the incident. While in a
prestigious tournament, a decision is made right away, for prac-
tice sessions, as in our experiments, this may take several weeks.
Up until today—several months after our experiments—the used
accounts have not been flagged and remain active.
5 RELATEDWORK
A large variety of aspects on protecting (online) games against
cheating have been considered in the past. Tian et al. [19] study
the state of protection mechanisms of mobile games against active
modifications of the game logic on the client-side. VAC [18], for
instance, is designed to fend of such basic modifications, but also
detecting entire program flows that are only possible due to cheats
has been shown to be feasible [1]. Many bots, however, act pas-
sively by assisting the user according to game logic. Often these are
easily detectable, though, based on unnatural input dynamics [6],
untypically high improvement [11], repetitive actions [10, 13], or a
general deviation from normality [12]. Our approach stays clear of
such artifacts and thereby surpasses other bots such as Katebot [9]
and Charlatano [7], which do not adapt to human behavior.
6 CONCLUSION
Aimbots intervene in the gameplay of first-person shooters to assist
the player in aiming at opponents. Automatic detection of such
cheats builds on being able to discriminate genuine from inhuman
actions. We argue that this differentiation is not necessarily existent
and is particularly challenging to make for professional players.
By demonstrating the evasion capabilities of gradual, user-specific
improvements against commercially established detection systems,
we hope to point the community towards new directions for protect-
ing online games. Interestingly, in other fields of computer security,
such as malware and attack detection, stealthiness and methods for
subverting detection have a long-standing history, already.
To effectively counter this problem for user-centric applications,
such as online games, merely refining the features that are used
for detection likely is insufficient. Instead, game objectives that
require a bot to perform repetitive and striking actions need to
be established. How these may look like for first-person shooter
games remains an open question.
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